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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO GENDER-
RESTRICTIVE SCHOOL DRESS CODES  
IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
By: Patrick Eoghan Murray1
This Article examines three potential 
constitutional challenges to a school dress code that 
mandates traditional gender norms. The analysis focuses 
on the Ninth Circuit to illustrate the various hurdles 
potential student litigants face from case law that is 
not explicitly overruled. It is likely that despite these 
challenges, a student litigant will be able to successfully 
advance a constitutional claim against such a dress code 
in the Ninth Circuit.
I. Introduction
On February 9, 2012, the School Board in 
Suffolk, Virginia proposed a dress code provision 
(DCP) that prohibited any “clothing worn by a 
student that is not in keeping with a student’s gender 
and causes a disruption and/or distracts others from 
the educational process or poses a health or safety 
concern.”2
Although no court ruled on the 
constitutionality of this particular dress code, 3 its 
proposal raised the question: What options do 
student litigants have if they are prevented from 
wearing clothing that allows them to expresses 
gender non-conformity? This Article analyzes 
potential constitutional claims that a student could 
bring against an identical provision and ultimately 
concludes that the Ninth Circuit would find it to be 
unconstitutional.4 
By limiting the analysis to the Ninth Circuit, 
this Article illustrates the various hurdles left behind 
from older precedent that conflict with more recent 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 
II. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Challenge 
The DCP expressly identifies gender as a basis 
for school administrators to regulate student dress. Its 
discriminatory nature is evident in the requirement 
that students conform to gender stereotypes: Girls 
cannot dress like boys, and boys cannot dress like 
girls. As such, the DCP arguably violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The validity of the DCP would largely 
turn on whether intermediate scrutiny or rational 
basis review is applied. A law that makes gender-
based classifications must survive intermediate 
scrutiny in order to be constitutional.5 Under 
intermediate scrutiny, a gender-based classification 
is unconstitutional unless it “serve[s] important 
governmental objectives and . . . [is] substantially 
related to achievement of those objectives.”6 This is a 
difficult standard to meet because the justification for 
the classification must be “exceedingly persuasive” to 
survive constitutional review.7
However, when a law does not make gender-
based classifications and is instead gender neutral on 
its face, the plaintiff must prove both a discriminatory 
purpose behind the law as well as a discriminatory 
impact in order to trigger intermediate scrutiny.8 
Absent proof of discriminatory intent, a gender-
neutral law will be subjected to rational basis review, 
the most lenient standard of constitutional review. If a 
court deems the DCP to be gender neutral and hence 
subject to rational basis review, it will be extremely 
difficult to establish an equal protection violation.9
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not legitimate.20 Put another way, if the assumption 
of the DCP is that school order and the students’ 
learning environment will be impaired if boys dress 
like girls and girls dress like boys, then the basis for 
the DCP may be constitutionally suspect. That said, a 
court is likely to accept as important a public school’s 
asserted interest in promoting order and a stable 
learning environment and not declare that purpose 
invalid even though it may rest on stereotypes that 
would not be acceptable outside the public school 
setting.21 
The DCP may be more constitutionally 
vulnerable at the second step of the analysis—
whether it is substantially related to the interest in 
school safety and a positive learning environment. In 
determining whether a gender-based classification is 
substantially related to the important goals, a court 
will scrutinize the classification to determine if it is 
necessary to achieve those goals.22 
In King, where a male student challenged 
the constitutionality of a hair-length requirement for 
men, the Ninth Circuit was persuaded by the opinions 
of teachers and school administrators who believed 
that the school dress code prevented behavior that 
“interfere[d] with the educational process.”.23 Eleven 
teachers and administrators submitted affidavits to 
support this position.24 The Ninth Circuit found that 
“none of the affidavits is so inherently improbable 
that it is lacking in value as evidence.”25
A proponent of the DCP, by contrast, would 
be unlikely to find similar support among school 
administrators to legitimize the regulation. At least in 
Suffolk, there seemed to be scant evidence of either 
danger to students or distraction in the classroom, 
and the School Board member who proposed 
the provision cited only vague and anonymous 
complaints.26 The principals of the schools in the 
Suffolk City Public Schools stated that “they hadn’t 
seen [teen boys wearing wigs, dresses, and make-
up to class],” and the superintendent had received 
no complaints and had seen only one instance of a 
gender-nonconforming student.27 Even the school 
board member who initially proposed the restriction 
on gender-nonconforming clothes admitted she had 
not received any complaints during the school year 
before the dress code provision was proposed.28
Furthermore, the argument that the DCP 
is substantially related to preventing distractions in 
In the Ninth Circuit a prospective plaintiff 
would have to overcome the obstacle of contrary 
Circuit precedent. Simply put, the Ninth Circuit 
has held that student dress codes that are gender 
explicit are nevertheless constitutional. The leading 
case is King v. Saddleback Junior College District ,10 
which involved an equal protection challenge to a 
public school dress code requirement that “[a] boy’s 
hair shall not fall below the eyes in front and shall 
not cover the ears, and it shall not extend below the 
collar in back.”11 Under the code, “[g]irls could have 
long hair and boys could not.”12 The Ninth Circuit 
in King rejected the equal protection claim, however, 
stating that neither the “difference in treatment [n]or 
classification . . . creat[ed] a substantial constitutional 
question.”13
However, King is at odds with four decades 
worth of subsequent Supreme Court precedent that 
has cast substantial constitutional doubt on gender-
based classifications that rest on assumptions about 
how females and males should look, act, or conduct 
themselves.14 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has not 
relied on King since the mid 1970s. Given these 
developments, it is unlikely that the Ninth Circuit 
would continue to adhere to King today, and instead, 
would apply intermediate scrutiny to the DCP.15
Under intermediate scrutiny, the analysis 
begins with the asserted government objective. The 
Supreme Court has warned parties who try to prove 
a substantial relationship between gender-based 
and an important governmental interest that “[t]he 
justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or 
invented post hoc in response to litigation.”16 Here, 
the language of the DCP recites the interest: in 
protecting the health and safety of students in the 
school environment and in providing an effective 
learning environment free of disruptions and 
distractions. These were the same reasons the Suffolk 
School Board specified at the time it considered this 
type of dress code provision.17 Maintaining the health 
and safety of public school students is unquestionably 
an important governmental interest.18 
However, to merely state that the DCP’s 
purpose is to protect students and promote a positive 
learning environment does not end the inquiry.19 
If the DCP rests on “fixed notions concerning the 
roles and abilities of males and females [that] reflects 
archaic and stereotypic notions,” then its purpose is 
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school is weak because of its over- and underinclusive 
nature.29 The DCP is over-inclusive because it likely 
implicates more students than just those who would 
be distracting or who would be the target of bullying.30 
The DCP is underinclusive because it ignores other 
forms of clothing that conforms to gender stereotypes 
but is nonetheless distracting and dangerous or could 
make students the targets of bullies. 
A gender-neutral dress code provision 
addressing distracting clothing seems much better 
suited to fulfilling the important governmental 
interests of maintaining student safety and an 
effective learning environment. Under such a 
provision, teachers would have the ability to restrict 
all distracting and provocative clothing and would not 
have to single out gender-nonconforming students. 
This is ultimately the type of dress code provision 
that the Suffolk School Board adopted when faced 
with the prospect of litigation.31
In short, the DCP is both over- and 
underinclusive with respect to the stated goals of 
ensuring safety and preventing distractions, and thus 
it is likely to be found unconstitutional at the second 
step of intermediate scrutiny review. 
III. First Amendment Challenge
A. Clothing Choice Can Constitute Expression for 
Purposes of the First Amendment
If a student is sanctioned under the DCP for 
wearing clothing that contains writing or a symbol—
for example, a shirt with the inscription “I am a girl” 
or a gender symbol—the expression on the clothing 
will likely be considered pure speech, and the student 
will have a cognizable First Amendment challenge 
to the DCP. 32 That type of pure speech, however, is 
probably not what the DCP’s drafters had in mind, 
and a school administrator may not even find it 
distracting enough to require removal.
The First Amendment protects not only 
verbal speech but also nonverbal speech, which the 
Supreme Court describes as “expressive conduct.”33 
Because an “apparently limitless variety of conduct 
can be labeled speech,” however, the Supreme Court 
has held that only conduct that is “sufficiently imbued 
with elements of communication” will be protected 
by the First Amendment.34 
While the First Amendment’s protection 
of expressive conduct does not require that the 
particularized message be “succinctly articulable,”35 
the actor must have “[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message . . . and in the surrounding 
circumstances the likelihood [must be] great that the 
message would be understood by those who viewed 
it.”36 
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on 
whether clothing choice implicates student speech. 
While some circuits have considered choice of 
clothing to potentially constitute expressive conduct, 
others have not.37
The Ninth Circuit has also not yet ruled 
on whether a student’s choice of clothing can be 
expressive conduct that triggers a First Amendment 
analysis. In Jacobs v. Clark County School District, 
the Ninth Circuit addressed several challenges 
to a public school district’s uniform policy that 
mandated “solid khaki colored bottoms and solid-
colored polo, tee, or button-down shirts (blue, red 
or white) with or without [the school’s] logos.”38 
The Ninth Circuit did not decide whether a student 
challenger’s refusal to wear the required uniform as a 
symbol of his opposition to conformity constituted 
expressive conduct.39 However, it presumed for the 
purpose of its analysis that the student had stated a 
First Amendment claim for “deprivation of . . . First 
Amendment rights to engage in expressive conduct via 
. . . choice of clothing and to be free from compelled 
speech”40 
In the case of the DCP, students may be able 
to demonstrate that their gender-nonconforming 
clothes constitute expressive conduct if they can 
demonstrate both an intent to convey a particularized 
message and a great likelihood that the message would 
be understood by those who viewed it. The students’ 
ability to do so would depend on the context in 
which the clothing was worn. If a student states that 
he or she did not have a purpose for wearing a certain 
kind of clothing, the First Amendment would not be 
implicated. However, if the student states that he or 
she sought to communicate a message via clothing, he 
or she would have a much better chance of sustaining 
a First Amendment claim.41 
The Supreme Court has long held that 
students in public schools do not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”42 “They cannot 
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be punished merely for expressing their personal views 
on the school premises . . . unless school authorities 
have reason to believe that such expression will 
‘substantially interfere with the work of the school or 
impinge upon the rights of other students.’”43 
In Tinker v. Des Moines, a group of students 
organized a silent protest of the United States’ 
involvement in the Vietnam War by wearing black 
armbands with a peace symbol.44 In anticipation of the 
protest, and in fear that it would cause a disturbance, 
the Des Moines Independent School District changed 
school policy to forbid students from wearing such 
armbands.45 After they were suspended for wearing 
their armbands, the students sued for violation of their 
right to free speech under the First Amendment.46 In 
finding in favor of the students, the Supreme Court 
concluded that “[i]n order for the State in the person 
of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular 
expression of opinion, it must be able to show that 
its action was caused by something more than a mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness 
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”47 
The Ninth Circuit has used Tinker as a 
guide in its analysis for all student-speech cases for 
expression that is not “vulgar, lewd, obscene, and 
plainly offensive speech . . . [or] school-sponsored 
speech.”48 However, the Ninth Circuit has limited 
the application of the heightened form of scrutiny 
articulated in Tinker to regulations that restrict a 
particular viewpoint or particular content.49 In Jacobs, 
the court distinguished the uniform policy at issue 
there from the armband restriction in Tinker.50 The 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that while Tinker involved a 
restriction on viewpoint warranting a higher level of 
scrutiny, the uniform policy in Jacobs was viewpoint- 
and content-neutral and thus deserved intermediate 
scrutiny.51 The court made this determination by 
examining both the purpose of the dress code and 
by considering how the uniform policy would work 
in practice.52 The court found both the text-based 
viewpoint-neutral purpose of the uniform policy 
and the viewpoint-neutral reasons the school board 
considered when it adopted the uniform policy to be 
reasons in favor of applying intermediate scrutiny.53 
Both the text of the rule in Jacobs and the records of 
the proceedings leading to its adoption emphasized 
the educational value of the rule rather than any effort 
to limit a particular viewpoint. The court considered 
claims that the policy restricted a particular viewpoint 
in practice, but ultimately ruled that “allowing 
students’ otherwise solid-colored clothing to contain 
a school logo-an item expressing little, if any, genuine 
communicative message-does not convert a content-
neutral school uniform policy into a content-based 
one.”54 
The DCP is likely to be found viewpoint 
and content-neutral because of its stated purpose. 
Just as in Jacobs, in which the stated purpose was to 
further an educational goal, the DCP states that the 
gender nonconforming clothing should be restricted 
to prevent “a disruption and/or [a distraction for] 
others from the educational process or poses a health 
or safety concern.”55 Additionally, if the adoption of 
the DCP in a Ninth Circuit school district resembles 
the proceedings in the Suffolk Virginia School Board, 
there will be evidence that the purpose was to prevent 
bullying and distractions, not the expression of gender 
non-conformity. Such a record would then be similar 
to the record in Jacobs, in which the court noted a 
desire to prevent distractions and reduce tensions 
between students.
An argument could be made that the DCP is 
viewpoint-restrictive because it favors one viewpoint 
over another: Gender-conforming viewpoints are 
protected, while gender-nonconforming viewpoints 
are restricted. However, even if students convincingly 
argue that gender non-conformity is a particular 
viewpoint, the restriction is minimal; students are 
only restricted from wearing clothes in school, and 
have the ability to express themselves outside of 
school. Additionally, the DCP does not prevent 
all opportunities to wear gender-nonconforming 
clothes—only gender-nonconforming clothes that 
cause distractions or danger to students.
B. It is Likely That the DCP Would Withstand 
First Amendment Intermediate Scrutiny
The Ninth Circuit has articulated a three-
part test for whether a school dress code passes 
intermediate scrutiny. The provision will be sustained 
if “(1) ‘it furthers an important or substantial 
government interest’; (2) ‘the governmental interest 
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression’; 
and (3) ‘the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential 
to the furtherance of that interest.’’’56
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1. The Ninth Circuit Would Likely Find 
That the DCP Furthers an Important 
Governmental Interest
In order to prove that the DCP furthers 
an important governmental interest, the proponent 
of the DCP must first prove that its “‘stated goals 
qualify as important or substantial’” and that “the 
government’s evidence ‘demonstrate[s] that the 
recited harms are real, not merely conjectural and 
that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms 
in a direct and material way.’”57 In Jacobs, the Ninth 
Circuit held that “the interest in fostering conducive 
learning environments for our nation’s children” was 
unquestionably an important interest.58 The school 
district in Jacobs was able to show that the uniform 
code furthered these goals by providing affidavits 
from the school administrators stating that the policy 
was working, and one report from the Department 
of Education acknowledging the benefits of school 
uniforms.59 The Ninth Circuit was also persuaded by 
the plaintiff ’s failure to produce any evidence that the 
policy had been a failure.60 
In order to satisfy this prong of the analysis, 
the proponent of the DCP would not need to show 
any empirical evidence that the DCP had been 
effective in preventing disruptions, distractions, or 
health and safety concerns. All that would be needed 
is affidavits from the teachers demonstrating that the 
DCP had been effective, and evidence that students 
had been singled out by bullies for wearing gender-
nonconforming clothing. The Suffolk School Board 
would have had difficulty satisfying this prong, since 
the only reports of distractions or bullying had been 
anonymous, but this could easily have been remedied 
had the teachers come forward before a case went to 
trial. 61
2. The Ninth Circuit Would Likely Find the 
DCP Unrelated to the Suppression of Free 
Expression
The proponent of the DCP must prove 
that the DCP is “‘unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression,’”62 In holding that this standard was 
satisfied in Jacobs, the Ninth Circuit determined 
that the stated purpose of the law was not aimed at 
preventing students from expressing their views on 
particular subjects.63 The court also found persuasive 
the absence of “evidence suggesting that the District’s 
stated goals were mere pretexts for its true purpose 
of preventing students from expressing their views on 
particular subjects.”64 
Since the stated goals of the DCP are to 
prevent disruptions, distractions, and to protect the 
health and safety of students, assuming no evidence 
of pretext emerges in a particular case, it is unlikely 
that the proponent of the DCP will have difficulty in 
satisfying this element.
3. The Ninth Circuit Would Likely Find 
Any Incidental Restrictions Imposed on 
Students’ First Amendment Freedoms 
Are No Greater Than is Essential to the 
Furtherance of the Goals of the DCP
The proponent of the DCP must prove that 
its restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are 
no greater than necessary by demonstrating that the 
regulation “‘leave[s] open ample alternative channels’ 
for student communication.”65 In Jacobs, the 
uniform policy was found to be narrowly tailored to 
achieve the school district’s objective because it only 
“limit[ed] students’ abilities to express themselves via 
their clothing choices,” and allowed students to “have 
verbal conversations with other students, publish 
articles in school newspapers, and join student 
clubs.”66 Also, the court in Jacobs was persuaded 
that even the choices in clothing was not “completely 
curtailed,” since students could still wear what they 
pleased “after school, on weekends, and at non-school 
functions.”67 While the court stated that the uniform 
policy satisfied this prong because its limitation was 
“during the narrowest possible window consistent 
with the District’s goals of creating a productive, 
distraction-free educational environment for its 
students,” the court did not consider any other less 
restrictive alternatives (more relaxed uniform policies) 
that could have achieved the same goal.68 
Under Jacobs, the Ninth Circuit would likely 
hold the DCP to be narrowly tailored. To be sure, 
clothing choice may sometimes be the only way a 
student can express his or her gender identity. 69 On 
the other hand, the DCP is limited in its scope: It 
applies only when students are in school, and even 
then, only when the clothes are disruptive, distracting, 
or dangerous. Students would still have the ability 
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to express their gender-nonconforming views in 
conversations with other students and to publish 
articles in school newspapers. They would also have 
the ability to wear gender-nonconforming clothing 
outside of school hours. 
IV. Vagueness Challenge
The DCP is vulnerable to a “void-for-
vagueness” challenge. This is because the DCP 
arguably does not give students adequate notice 
about the type of clothing that is banned, and because 
the term “gender” leaves room for discriminatory 
enforcement. However, courts generally have taken 
a deferential stance when it comes to public school 
regulations of students and accordingly rejected void-
for-vagueness challenges.  That line of precedent 
will be difficult to overcome for plaintiffs seeking to 
challenge the DCP. 
A law can be found to be vague for “two 
independent reasons.”70 First, the doctrine of vagueness 
“incorporates notions of fair notice or warning,”71 and 
a regulation violates due process of law by failing to 
provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct.72 In 
short, a regulation is void for vagueness if it “forbids 
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that 
[persons] of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”73 
Second, the void-for-vagueness doctrine prohibits 
rules that permit “arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.”74 “A vague law impermissibly delegates 
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries 
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis . . 
. .”75 “[P]erhaps the most meaningful aspect of the 
vagueness doctrine is . . . the requirement that a 
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement.”76 
A. The DCP’s Use of the Term “Gender” is 
Arguably Vague
The DCP’s use of the term “gender” raises 
two possible vagueness problems. The first is how the 
students’ gender should be defined. The second is 
how school officials (including teachers) or students 
would determine what clothes are “in keeping with a 
student’s gender.” 
1. How Should a Student’s “Gender” Be 
Defined?
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines 
“gender” as applied to people in two ways: “a) sex 
and b) the behavioral, cultural, or psychological traits 
typically associated with one sex.”77 
“Sex” is the more straightforward of the 
two definitions, but still leaves plenty of room for 
interpretation (and confusion). Sex refers to “either 
of the two major forms of individuals that occur in 
many species and that are distinguished respectively 
as female or male especially on the basis of their 
reproductive organs and structures.”78 The distinction 
can be drawn in different ways: the structure and 
function of an individual’s genitalia, the production 
of various hormones in an individual, or the structure 
of the chromosomes found within each cell of the 
individual’s body (XY chromosomes for males and 
XX for females).79 Even these biological distinctions 
do not necessarily lead to a binary division. About 
1.7 percent of the population is born “intersex”—a 
condition in which an individual is born with the 
physical characteristics of both sexes—and defies 
categorization into either group.80 Courts have not 
agreed on what physical traits should be determinative 
of an individual’s sex.81
The second definition of gender is nebulous. 
It describes gender as a combination of how society 
defines an individual and how the individual defines 
him or herself.82 In western society, gender has 
evolved to be considered a binary concept—so that 
it is associated with the two main sexes.83 However, 
what society views as “masculine” or “feminine” varies 
dramatically across generations, has changed over 
time, and continues to change.84 Also, individuals 
may be transgender and have a different gender 
identity from either their biological sex or societal 
expectations.85 
By failing to define how school officials should 
determine a student’s gender, the DCP provides 
inadequate notice of what clothing is permissible to 
intersex students or transgender students. Intersex 
students will not fall neatly into either of the 
categories of male or female, and transgender students 
may adopt a different gender identity from the label 
that society places on them. The language of the 
DCP does not provide guidance for these students. 
THE MODERN AMERICAN24
Additionally, because the statute does not provide a 
definition of gender, teachers have vast discretion to 
apply their own conception of gender to students. 
This opens the door to discrimination against intersex 
and transgender students by teachers.86
2. What is Clothing That is “In Keeping 
With a Student’s Gender”?
If defining a student’s gender is difficult, 
determining what clothing is “in keeping with a 
student’s gender” is even more difficult. Clothing is 
inanimate and does not have biological indicators to 
guide how it should be categorized, so the gender of 
an article of clothing is entirely based upon societal 
and cultural views.87 These views have changed over 
time and continue to change. 88 Androgynous fashion 
is moving from the cutting edge of the fashion world 
to the global mainstream.89 Many students have 
adopted gender-nonconforming clothing in their 
personal style and have different views from their 
teachers as to what clothing is in keeping with their 
gender.90
By failing to define what clothing is “in 
keeping with a student’s gender,” the DCP arguably 
provides inadequate notice to students making 
clothing choices. Depending on how regressive a 
school official’s views on fashion are, the official 
could conceivably enforce the DCP against any girl 
who, for example, wears pants, a baseball cap, or a 
short hairstyle. Similarly, an official could conceivably 
enforce the DCP against any boy who wears the color 
pink, has long hair, or wears earrings.
B. A Certain Level of Vagueness is Permitted in 
the Public School Context
These potential vagueness problems with 
the DCP are probably insufficient to overcome 
the deference that courts typically afford public 
school administrators. Simply put, in the public 
school context, the vagueness doctrine is relaxed 
significantly. In particular, courts give teachers and 
school administrators flexibility to protect the safety 
of students and maintain order within schools, which 
is, of course, the premise of the DCP.
 In Bethel v. Fraser, for example, the student 
plaintiff was suspended for giving an innuendo-laden 
speech to a school assembly.91 The student argued that 
the suspension was a violation of due process.92 The 
student claimed that because the school disciplinary 
rule proscribing “obscene” language did not provide 
adequate notice, “he had no way of knowing that 
the delivery of the speech in question would subject 
him to disciplinary sanctions.”93 The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, emphasizing the need for 
deference to public school administrators in their 
efforts to provide for a safe learning environment. The 
Court stated: “We have recognized that ‘maintaining 
security and order in the schools requires a certain 
degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, 
and we have respected the value of preserving the 
informality of the student-teacher relationship.’”94 
The Ninth Circuit has not addressed a 
void for vagueness challenge to a school dress code 
provision. However, in Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified 
School District, a district court in the Ninth Circuit 
rejected a challenge to a school dress code provision 
on vagueness grounds.95 The provision at issue in 
that case allowed school officials to prohibit apparel 
that would cause a disruption to school activities.96 
The court emphasized the same goals of maintaining 
order in school that were articulated in Fraser, and 
concluded that the dress code at issue provided just 
as much guidance as the school regulation in Fraser.97 
The court added that the “[p]laintiffs d[id] not cite 
to a single instance, in this circuit or any other, of 
a school dress code’s ban on disruptive conduct or 
apparel being held overly vague, and the Court is 
aware of none.”98 
By contrast, in Stephenson v. Davenport 
Community School District, the Eighth Circuit struck 
down on vagueness grounds a school disciplinary 
provision that stated that “gang related activities such 
as display of ‘colors,’ symbols, signals, signs, etc., 
will not be tolerated on school grounds” without 
providing a definition of the term “gang.”99 The 
Eighth Circuit counterbalanced the need in Fraser 
to provide flexibility with the fact that the school 
provision infringed upon First Amendment rights.100 
The court held that the disciplinary provision was 
facially void for vagueness for failing to define “gang,” 
the “pivotal term.”101 The court based this reasoning 
on the fact that failing to define the term “gang” would 
not place students on notice of what type of behavior 
was prohibited, and on the fact that the provision 
“allow[ed] school administrators and local police 
unfettered discretion to decide what represents a 
gang symbol.”102 The court suggested that the schools 
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should provide describe specifically the “gang related 
activities it wishes to avoid” because “[g]ang symbols 
. . . take many forms and are constantly changing,” 
or otherwise those who enforce the provision will not 
have “meaningful guidance.”103 
It is difficult to determine which of these 
approaches the Ninth Circuit would adopt if it were 
faced with a vagueness challenge to the DCP. On 
the one hand, the DCP is similar to the provision in 
Stephenson because it is premised on a pivotal term—
gender—which directs the school administrator’s 
enforcement without providing a definition. Like 
the term “gang,” “gender” is a term that is constantly 
changing and is open to a wide range of interpretations. 
It also leaves teachers with nearly all of the discretion 
as to how the term DCP would be enforced.
On the other hand, the DCP has a caveat 
directing teachers to enforce this provision only 
for gender non-conforming clothes that “[cause] a 
disruption and/or distracts others from the educational 
process or poses a health or safety concern.”104 This 
provides a limitation on the vague term of “gender” 
that did not exist in Stephenson, and seems to bring it 
closer to the restriction at issue in Dariano. Thus, the 
DCP probably would not be invalidated on vagueness 
grounds.
V. Conclusion
A gender-nonconforming student litigant 
in the Ninth Circuit will be faced with numerous 
obstacles in trying to prove that a gender-restrictive 
dress code provision is unconstitutional. However, 
given the existence of three plausible constitutional 
challenges, it is highly likely that a dress code provision 
similar to that recently enacted by the Suffolk Virginia 
School Board would be found to be unconstitutional.
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